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Response
Anssi Miettinen
There could not be a better time than now to share some thoughts
about globalization, or the thing called the global economy. The sec-
ond biggest economy in the world, Japan’s, is in recession. The emerg-
ing markets of Asia have been in crisis for more than a year. The
economy of Russia is collapsing. The Asian “flu” may spread to China.
The stock markets of Latin America have tumbled because investors
are afraid that the depreciation of Southeast Asian currencies will hit
the exports of South American countries. It seems that even the big and
powerful United States is not immune to this disease: the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, the heartbeat of the American economy, goes up
and down like a rollercoaster. What in the world is happening on
planet Earth? It’s the global economy, stupid!
As we all know, the globalization process is by no means new. Dur-
ing this decade, the concept has appeared in many positive contexts,
maybe because international trade has increased and many regions
have enjoyed economic growth. Recently, however, we have seen the
dark side of the moon and there are plenty of pessimists who now talk
about the possibility of global recession, if not depression.
I met one of those pessimists, the Nobel Prize-winning economist
Paul A. Samuelson, a professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. He said that the situation is like in the Swiss Alps,
where the snow has accumulated, and any pistol shot can cause an
avalanche.1 He insisted that a possible global crisis would not be the
aftermath of the chaos in Russia, but that Russia’s meltdown could be
the pistol shot. Although the world stock markets reacted strongly to
the Russian crisis, we must keep in mind that Russia’s economy is
about the size of that of the Netherlands. Compared with the economic
superpowers — the United States, Japan, and the European Monetary
Union (due to start in 1999)—Russia’s economy is tiny, a fact Professor
Samuelson emphasized by saying, “The only Russian product I have
consumed in years is caviar.” The New York Times made an apt com-
parison on 29 August 1998, when it noted that, in one week, the value
of Japanese stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange had dropped by a
sum that exceeded the size of the Russian economy.2
But these observations don’t make the Russian turmoil insignificant.
And for us Finns, Russian troubles are our worries. Vladimir Popov
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gives an interesting overview of the serious problems that preceded
the latest crisis and that partly caused it.3
Dr. Popov’s essay helped me understand why the latest crisis in
Russia occurred, and his main points make a lot of sense. For example,
he argues that the speed of the Russian reforms did not matter a great
deal. Instead, he thinks the Russian government mishandled the inter-
nationalization process in three ways: by sustaining the overvalued
exchange rate of the ruble; by sticking to import-substitution policy
and failing to stimulate exports; and by failing, or not even trying, to
attract straight foreign investment.
But there were other reasons for the failure that the government
could not do much about. Those were the initial conditions inherited
from the era of central planning. This heritage was far worse than in
most other transition economies, and there are still distortions of
industrial structure and trade patterns. With a comparative analysis,
Popov concludes that the legacy of central planning in former Soviet
Union republics was much worse than in East European countries.
Popov demands the devaluation of the ruble because there could be
no economic growth without it. I agree, because my country faced a
severe depression in the beginning of the 1990s, and most economists
now say that one reason for it was the policy of the strong mark (our
currency).
But I am skeptical about Dr. Popov’s argument that promoting
export-oriented growth would require massive and rapid industrial
restructuring, which would favor resource-based industries and some
competitive sectors like the aerospace industry. That would mean
more unemployment, and I am not sure if Russia should assume that
burden right now. It would also mean that Russia would move back-
wards, to be only an exporter of resources, oil, and gas, which does not
require the educated, skilled workforce that the country still has.
I would like to propose other ways to deal with the noncompetitive
industries, maybe because my country still feels the wounds of unem-
ployment, which caused personal tragedies for many. For example, I
don’t think Russia should stop subsidizing noncompetitive industries
all at once; instead, it should attempt to transform those companies
into productive ones. I don’t exactly know how that would happen,
but perhaps the government should force the owners of bad compa-
nies to sell their stakes to foreign companies or global conglomerates.
After all, most of the noncompetitive companies are still there because
of the government’s subsidies. And the foreign companies could try to
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change nonprofitable plants and businesses. I would even suggest that
bad companies should be given to foreigners for free, if the alternative
would be bankruptcy. Exports must grow, but unemployment must
not!
Dr. Popov points out that Russia has failed to attract foreign invest-
ment. And direct foreign investments are what globalization — or
“internationalization,” as Dr. Popov calls it — is all about. Russia’s
refusal to allow foreigners to get rich on Russian resources may be a
case of unnecessary nationalism, or perhaps it indicates that many
Russian politicians do not understand what a global market economy
means and requires. I contend that Russian workers won’t mind who
owns their companies as long as they are paid well. There are other,
fundamental, reasons why foreign investors are not building produc-
tion facilities in Russia. Yeltsin’s reforms failed, Popov writes, because
the institutions needed to enforce law and order and carry out a man-
ageable transition collapsed. Capitalism needs strong, efficient institu-
tions for taxing, financing businesses, and insuring that people
involved in the free market play by the rules. Because relevant legisla-
tion in Russia is weak and incomplete, conduct occurs there that in
other countries would be considered illegal. The weakness of Russian
institutions is the secret behind the failure to partake of the global
economy.
In their book Fixing Russia’s Banks: A Proposal for Growth, Michael S.
Bernstam and Alvin Rabushka claim that an economic boom in Russia
has not yet occurred because Russia has failed to develop a financial
system independent of the government.4 More specifically, it has failed
to create a real commercial banking system, which is an essential com-
ponent of the market economy. Russian banks do not engage in the
normal banking practices of accepting deposits and making loans.
Since they do not facilitate normal investment, they do not contribute
to growth. In fact, Bernstam and Rabushka argue that Russian banks
are not really banks at all. Yet they seem to be at the center of the coun-
try’s phony capitalism. It might be fair to say that Russia is an oli-
garchy: a lot of power is in the hands of greedy men who don’t care
much about the well-being of the citizens. Those men dominate the
banks. Russian economist Grigory Yavlinsky wrote recently that the
current Russian economy shows signs of evolving toward Western-
style capitalism on the one hand and consolidating corporatist, crimi-
nal-style capitalism on the other. Yavlinsky sees that one trend of the
corporatist and corrupt market is the rise of Russian oligarchs, who
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have created a form of robber-baron capitalism: “Far from creating an
open market, Russia has consolidated a semi-criminal oligarchy that
was already largely in place under the old Soviet system. After com-
munism’s collapse, it merely changed its appearance, just as a snake
sheds its skin.”5
Yavlinsky, a leader of a democratic, reformist party, points out that
the new ruling elite is neither democratic nor communistic, neither
conservative nor liberal — merely rapaciously greedy. He thinks that
its market of insider deals and political connections stands in the way
of an open economy that would benefit all Russian citizens. (Seven
bankers were behind Boris Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996, when the Rus-
sian media were unfairly supportive of the sitting president. These
bankers control a great deal of Russian media.)
The rise of the robber barons is one sign of Russia’s inability to cre-
ate trust, which is essential if Russia wants to rise from its slump. One
rule of the global economy—in fact, of any economy—is that no trust
means no investors and few friends. The weakness of institutions or
the total lack of them has led to corruption (and vice versa). In fact,
many observers consider Russia one of the most corrupt countries in
the world. As Popov points out, crime rates are up, and the portion of
the shadow economy is exceptionally high.
Maybe most alarming of all, Russia has suffered, and will continue
to suffer from what I would call moral damage, at least in the eyes of
the Western world. Without suggesting that Finnish or American peo-
ple are role models, I believe something seems to be wrong with the
moral order of Russia. Maybe it is a heritage of the Soviet Union,
where religion played a minor role and the Communist Party failed to
build a sound ethical framework. After all, introducing values is not
something governments can do with five-year plans. In the global
economy, moral damage is economic damage. The ultimate question
is: How do you make a moral reform? And what kinds of conditions
would the IMF set for such a reform?
Perhaps more than any other country, Finland suffers from Russia’s
problems. When I walk through the famous, old, and traditional
Finnish department store, Stockmann, I hear more people speaking
Russian than Swedish, which is the second official language of Fin-
land. I often wonder why these Russians come there since there is a
branch of Stockmann in Moscow. I have talked with many Finnish
business leaders who all say that they would be very interested in
investing in Russian markets if it were not so risky. Something has
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changed since the Soviet era, when companies could trust they would
get their payments on time. Today, Finland’s exports to Russia repre-
sent 7 percent of all Finnish exports and account for around 3 percent
of GDP. That is still far less than the bilateral trade between Finland
and the Soviet Union, which was around 20 percent of all foreign
trade.6
But I believe Finland can survive the crisis in Russia, thanks to a
national readiness for the global economy. We Finns realize that the
global forces are bigger than we are and that we must adjust and com-
pete in order to succeed. But that wisdom has come at a huge cost —
the depression that began in the early 1990s and that has created mass
unemployment.
Despite its downside, globalization opens up free trade. In an envi-
ronment where all countries have to compete for jobs and investments,
small and developed countries have to choose a different strategy for
globalization. Finland cannot attract straight foreign investments from
labor-intensive industries because of our small size and high wages.
We have to rely on education, information-related jobs, services, and,
of course, our naturally strong industries, forestry and metal. And we
have to rely on information technology to boost productivity.
Globalization is a rough business. Workers must be prepared to
change, and job security is — well, there is no such thing. The only
thing that is permanent is change: these wise words are the slogan of
Nokia, Finland’s most successful company and our nation’s symbol of
globalization. A leading manufacturer of cellular phones and systems,
Nokia has emerged from the ashes in just a few years to become a lead-
ing player in the telecommunications industry. Its success proves that
a company doesn’t have to be from the United States or some other
economic superpower in order to become influential. Innovation,
superior education, and, of course, good luck all play a key role.
But is Nokia truly a Finnish company? We think it still is, although
in August 1998, 80 percent of Nokia was owned by foreign investors.
Nonetheless, the headquarters are in Finland, as well as most of the
knowledge-based jobs; Nokia has factories all over the world in low-
wage countries, but the most important assets — engineers and other
experts—are mostly based in Finland.
Foreign ownership has been a big issue in my country in the last few
years, because many Finnish decision-makers have been suspicious
about foreign, mainly American, investors, who own approximately 50
percent of the companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. So far,
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these foreign investors have been quiet owners, and few of the funds
have even registered their stocks so they could vote in the annual
meetings. But what happens when the next recession comes? Will they
be aggressive, or will they just dump the shares?
At the newspaper where I work, I am responsible for covering infor-
mation technology and telecommunication industries. As a result, I am
keenly aware of the importance and the problems of the Internet in the
globalization process. A year ago, I was covering the OECD conference
called “Dismantling Barriers of Global Electronic Commerce” where there
was a strong consensus that the growth of electronic commerce should
be controlled by the private sector, although this poses many problems
for governments around the world. One difficult problem is taxation.
Should governments tax electronic transactions? Are they even capa-
ble of doing so? The Clinton administration says they shouldn’t. To
many, this may sound unbelievable: governments don’t want to tax e-
commerce, which is supposed to be a $100 billion business! The reason
is that they don’t want to slow the development of electronic com-
merce, and also because they don’t really have the means to do so.
On the Internet or other networks, money and information can
change countries in milliseconds. What about customs and tariffs on
goods and services that are ordered from other countries? It seems that
the Internet will be the first truly global marketplace of so-called lais-
sez-faire capitalism. But like Russia, the Internet also needs trust in
order to succeed. If you want to make a purchase and you send the
number of your credit card through the Internet, you want to be sure
that the merchant is honest and that nobody steals the information.
Internet commerce also raises serious concerns about money launder-
ing and the security of transactions. Like other aspects of globalization,
the Internet, too, needs some self-controlling institutions, although in
this case, most of the problems can be solved with technology.
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